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In his article in Issue 13.1 of this publica-tion, Dr. Robert Keeley suggests an imag-inative and altogether logical course of 
action to enhance the Ottawa Convention—
amend it.1
For years, James Madison University’s Mine 
Action Information Center has called for an 
approach to mine action that would not sac-
rifice pragmatic plans and scarce resources 
on the altar of an unrealistic, “mine free” ap-
proach to landmine clearance. The reasons to 
us have always been evident: In a world suffer-
ing from so many humanitarian, medical, post-
conflict and development issues, insisting on 
the removal of every last landmine would di-
lute practical planning and management pro-
cedures, while requiring almost unimaginable 
amounts of resources.
Which Endstate?
The debate among supporters of “mine free,” 
“impact free” and “mine safe” endstates has 
generally been relegated to the realm of coffee 
breaks and free-form discussions at Standing 
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Amending the Ottawa      
             Convention: A Way Forward
With clearance deadlines for States Parties to the Ottawa Convention approaching or 
having passed, and available humanitarian aid being spread among an exploding num-
ber of worthy activities, should mine-action programs be held to the stringent letter 
of the Convention? The author posits that, with a simple solution, States Parties can 
fulfill the spirit of the agreement while eliminating costly, time-consuming and inef-
ficient clearance obligations. 
Committee Meetings of the Ottawa Conven-
tion. The “mine free” approach derives from 
Article 5, paragraph 1: “Each State Party under-
takes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all 
anti-personnel mines,” while the “impact free” 
proponents base their argument on the Pream-
ble, which sets as its goal “an end to suffering 
and casualties” [emphasis added].2 The goal of 
any strategic plan sets the path forward, and 
mine action is no different. Such terms estab-
lish the measures of effectiveness and progress 
to be achieved, and disagreements relating to 
the proper endstate invariably result in confu-
sion and dissention in policy as well as opera-
tional circles.
The obligation of the United Kingdom to help 
clear the Falkland-Malvinas Islands has forced 
the debate into the world of realpolitik. The 
United Kingdom has been one of the staunch-
est supporters of the Ottawa Convention, yet has 
both received and delivered harsh comments 
during heated exchanges relating to its Article 5 
obligations—and no wonder. Critics of the U.K. 
argue that the convention is clear, and that the 
U.K. government is required to “de-
stroy or ensure the destruction of all 
anti-personnel mines in mined areas 
under its jurisdiction or control.”2 At 
the 9th Meeting of the States Parties, 
British Ambassador John Duncan re-
sponded with some stern logic, ob-
serving that it would be unwise for his 
country to spend US$100 million 
to clear an area in the Falkland-
Malvinas Islands that has been 
without landmine accidents for the 
past 25 years. Clearly, he said, the 
money could be better spent. The 
U.K. observed that it was the spir-
it and not the letter of the Conven-
tion that it was upholding. This 
assertion came as a thunderbolt in 
that it confirmed what has been the 
position of the United States and 
others for a long time: Striving for 
a true impact-free environment is 
the most practical and logical way 
to approach mine action.
Extension Requests
At the conclusion of the first de-
cade of the Ottawa Convention, the 
great majority of countries with 
clearance deadlines (15 of the 17 in 
2009) have requested an extension to 
their Convention obligations. There-
fore, we must ask several questions 
regarding the failure to meet clear-
ance deadlines: 
1. Why have so many countries 
had to request extensions? 
2. As all 15 extension requests 
were granted by member states, 
will the international commu-
nity (donors, international or-
ganizations, nongovernmental 
organizations, etc.) accept the 
rationale and costs for exten-
sion requests and approvals? 
3. What does this situation mean 
for further support to affected 
countries?
4. How will it affect the donors 
providing financial support for 
clearance activities? 
5. How will it affect the need for 
resources relating to develop-
ment and humanitarian aid? 
The CISR/MAIC believes that the 
impetus for an amendment to pro-
vide the proper guidance for these ef-
forts is found in the first 14 words of 
the Convention: “Determined to put 
an end to the suffering and casual-
ties caused by anti-personnel land-
mines.”2 Clearly the imperative to 
relieve suffering trumps any particu-
lar operational methodology. We also 
note a disturbing trend in discus-
sions alluding to Article 5, paragraph 
2, which states that “Each State Party 
shall make every effort to identify all 
areas under its jurisdiction or con-
trol in which anti-personnel mines 
are known or suspected to be em-
placed”2 [emphasis added]—there 
being an implication that not know-
ing of landmines may be a way out 
of the political dilemma. To meet 
the question honestly and frankly 
seems to us the best recourse, rath-
er than skirting the issue by fenc-
ing with words or playing legalistic 
roulette as affected countries try to 
satisfy the requirements of various 
donors and stakeholders.
Time for an Amendment
We do not understand the contro-
versy about addressing the question 
of an amendment to the Conven-
tion. No one at the original meeting 
ruled out the need for amendments 
in the future, and Keeley points out 
that the U.S. Constitution has grown 
stronger—not weaker—through its 
amendment process.1 Certainly the 
framers of the Mine Ban Conven-
tion envisioned the potential to up-
date and enhance the document by 
inclusion of Article 13, which lays 
out a very clear set of procedures to 
amend it.
In light of countries being unable 
to complete Article 5 clearance ob-
ligations and the confusing discrep-
ancies between the terms found in 
the Preamble and Article 5, we won-
der why no State Party has suggested 
an amendment to clarify this key is-
sue and discuss it during an Amend-
ment Conference. 
See Endnotes, Page 77 
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Do you favor or oppose an amendment to the Mine 
Ban Convention to clarify the endstate required 
for clearance efforts? Tell us your opinion—take 
the Ottawa Convention Amendment Survey at: 
http://maic.jmu.edu
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